The Hazaras speak Farsi and are mostly Shi'i Muslims (primarily Twelver Shi'i, some Ismaili Shi'is), yet there are also some Sunni Muslim Hazaras. They settled in Afghanistan at least as far back as the 13th century. Hazaras have always lived on the edge of economic survival. As a result of Pashtun expansionism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries which was fueled by Sunni prejudices against the Shi'i (thus attracting the help of the mostly Sunni Tajiks and Uzbeks) the Hazaras were driven to the barren dry mountains of central Afghanistan (the Hazarajat) where they live today separated into nine regionally distinct enclaves. The Hazaras are primarily sedentary farmers practicing some ancillary herding.

Many Hazaras also migrated to the major towns, particularly Kabul where they occupied the lowest economic rungs. It is perhaps this economic deprivation which caused the Hazaras and other Shi'i to organize politically during the 1960s and 1970s and concentrate on gaining political autonomy for themselves during the Soviet occupation. During the Soviet occupation, the Soviets abandoned any pretense of controlling the region. During this time, the Hazaras engaged in a violent civil war. From its founding in 1747 by Ahmad Shah, Afghanistan has traditionally been dominated by the Pashtuns, who before 1978 (the date of the last reliable census in Afghanistan) constituted a 47% minority in the country. However, as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion the population distribution in Afghanistan has changed. About 85% of the 6.2 million Afghani refugees who fled to Iran and Pakistan due to the invasion and the war that followed it are Pashtuns. This, accordingly, lowered the percentage of Pashtuns in Afghanistan's population and raised the percentages of the country's other ethnic groups until the mid-1990s when many of the refugees returned. This raised the percentage of Hazaras in Afghanistan from 8% in 1978 to 14% in 1987. The Hazaras now constitute about 9% of Afghanistan's population.

The Soviet invasion of December 1979 has been the major determining factor in Afghanistan's ethnic relations since that point in time. The Hazaras were among those who fought against the Communist government and they succeeded in liberating much of their homeland early on in the civil war. During the 1980s, they reached an agreement with the government in Kabul that in exchange for not attacking the government, the Hazaras were allowed to live relatively independent lives. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 has only affected the power relations among the country's various factions but has not changed the fact that they are in constant competition with each other. However, the population shift that occurred during the 1980s has weakened the Pashtuns and allowed other ethnic groups to become more involved in the country's government. Thus, the civil war is a mixed blessing; it puts the Hazaras in physical jeopardy (along with the rest of the Afghan population) but it makes them useful as allies. Once the civil war ends, it is likely that the Hazaras will again be shut out of power and suffer from religiously fueled discrimination and lose the independence that they gained in their war with the former Communist government.

One theory of the origins of the Hazaras is that they are descended from Mongolians. Other theories are that they are native to the region or are of mixed origin. At least partial Mongol descent is difficult to reject, because the Hazaras' physical attributes and parts of their culture and language resemble that of the Mongolians. Thus, it is widely accepted that Hazaras do have Mongolian ancestry, if not being direct male-line descendants of Genghis Khan, as some Hazaras consider themselves to be. A Mongol element in the ancestry of the Hazara is supported by studies in genetic genealogy, which have identified a particular lineage of th Y-chromosome characteristic of people of Mongolian descent.. This chromosome is virtually absent outside the limits of the Mongol Empire except among the Hazara people, where it reaches its highest frequency anywhere. About two thirds of the sample Hazara males carry a Y chromosome from this lineage. Additionally, some Hazara tribes are named after notable Mongol generals, including the Tulai Khan Hazara named after Tolui, the youngest son of Genghis Khan. The theories of Mongol descent or partial Mongol descent, are further strengthened given that the Il-Khanate Mongol rulers, beginning with Oljeitu, embraced Shia Islam. Today, almost all Hazaras adhere to Shiism, whereas Afghanistan's other ethnic groups are mostly Sunni.

Another theory proposes that Hazaras are descendants of the Kushans, the ancient dwellers of Afghanistan famous for constructing the Buddhas of Bamiyan. Proponents of this view find the location of Hazara homeland and the similarity in the facial features of the Hazaras and those on the frescoes and Buddha's statues in Bamiyan suggestive. However, this belief is vitiated not only by the fact that the Kushans were Indo-European Tocharians, but also by historical records which mention that in a particularly bloody battle around Bamiyan, Genghis Khan's grandson, Mutugen, was killed, and he ordered Bamiyan burnt to the ground in retribution, renaming it Ma-Obaliq ("Uninhabitable Abode") while replacing the local population with his armies and settlers.

The third theory maintains that Hazaras are a much more mixed race. The mixed race theory is not entirely inconsistent with descent from Mongol military forces since many of the Mongol allies were from Turkic tribes. According to one version of the mixed origins theory, Nikudari Mongols settled in eastern Persia and mixed with the native populations that spoke various Iranian languages.Another version suggests that Chaghatai Mongols first came from Central Asia and were followed by other Mongols, Turko-Mongols, Ilkhanates (that were driven out of Persia), and Timurids all of whom settled in Hazarajat and mixed with the local Persian population forming a distinct group.

The Hazaras proper traditionally occupied an area extending from the central spine of the Hindu Kush southward though the foothills to Ghazni, Mukur, and nearly to Kandahar and from the Paghman Range, just west of Kabul, to an undetermined point some distance east of Heart. The name "Hazarajat" has been given to this area south of the Hindu Kush. The Timuri, who live east of the Unai Pass toward Kabul, do not consider themselves as dwelling in the Hazarajat, although they are accepted without question as Hazaras. On the other hand, the Yek Aulang, who lives in the Yek Aulang Valley on the north slope of the main Kohi Baba Range of the Hindu Kush, is included in the Hazarajat.

In the late 1880's many of the Hazara tribes revolted against Abdur Rahman, the first ruler to bring thecountry of Afghanistan under a centralized Afghan government. Consequent on this unsuccessful revolt,
numbers of Hazaras fled to Quetta in Baluchistan and to the area around Meshed in northeastern Iran. Most active in the revolt were the Uruzgani, the southernmost of the Hazara tribes. Following their defeat, a considerable number of Uruzgani left the country, as did many Jaghuri, their nearest neighbors to the northeast. The territory, which they abandoned, was occupied by Afghans of the Ghilzai tribe. In 1904
Habibullah Khan, successor to Abdur Rehman as amir of Afghanistan, issued a proclamation granting amnesty to the Hazaras who had taken refuge in India and Iran and inviting them to return to Afghanistan. They were promised new land in Turkestan to replace that in the south, which had been appropriated by Afghan, and many took advantage of this offer. While considerable colonies remain around Quetta and Meshed, the majority of the emigrant Uruzgani, many Jaghuri, and fragments of other tribes are today to be found in the general area between Maimaneh and Mazar-e-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan.

The author was unable to visit Turkestan, and data obtained from informants in Meshed were not adequate for mapping the distribution of tribes in the north. This group of Hazaras seems to have been completely overlooked by travelers in the area who have published their observations. For the Hazarajat, the former locations of a number of tribes are shown on Survey of India maps, and these locations can sometimes be checked with other sources. However, the locations of tribes shown on Map I should not be taken as representing the present location. Afghan tribes have been encroaching from the south, and a recent publication shows that, in the west, former Hazara territory is now occupied by tribes of the Chahar Aimak. Just as the tribal map shown in this volume is out of date, so the tribal population estimates given below are over forty years old. Lacking more recent data, the map and the population estimates will serve as a point of departure for an analysis of social structure. They should not, however, be accepted as representing thepresent location and population of tribes in the Hazarajat

The largest and most stable of the Hazara tribes are the Dai Kundi (population 52,000), Dai Zangi (60,000), Besud (100,000), Polada (45,000), Jaghuri (117,500) and Uruzgani (65,000). The first four listed are traditionally considered as belonging among the "original" Hazara tribes, "Sad-i- Qabar". The Uruzgani are said to be made up of two branches - the Dai Khitai and the Dai Chopan - which themselves formerly constituted independent "original" tribes. The Jaghuri are among those tribes considered as "Sad-i-Sueka", of mixed descent. Of the other original tribes, the Sheikh Ali live north of the Hindu Kush and, because of their religion (Ismaili Shia and Sunni), are not accepted as part of the Hazara community. The Dahla, said by one informant to be extinct were listed by another informant as a section o the Polada. According to a scholarly Hazara informant, Mr. Khuda Nazar Qambaree, Dahla is a place name, the abode of the Zauli, who belonged to the Dai or tribe of Dala-Mezo, o which he Sultan Ahmad formed another branch. Dala-Mezo no longer exists as a tribe. An Uruzgani informant named the sultan Ahmad as the Uruzgani division to which he belonged and gave Zauli as another division of the Uruzgani.

Of the tribes not considered as among the original Hazara tribes, the Dai Mirdad, with an estimated population o 10,000, was named as a separate tribe by an informant familiar with the area as of 1910, whereas later it appears to have become a branch of the Besud. The Chahar Dasta (9,250), Muhammad Khwaja (16,650), and Jaghatu (42,350) are sometimes grouped together as the Ghazni Hazaras. The first two formerly constituted a single tribe which had branched off from the Dai chopan; but, whereas they are listed as Sad-i Sueka, that is, of mixed origin, the Dai Chopan are Sad-i Qabar, of "pure" origin. The Babuli and Chora, formerly independent tribes were listed by some informants as a consolidated subsection, known as the Sher Ahmad, of the Dai Khitai branch of the Uruzgani, although others regarded them as belonging to the Dai Kundi tribe. The Yek Aulang, mentioned earlier as dwelling just north of the Hindu Kush, are said to be an offshoot of the Dai Zangi. The Kalandar are said to be of the same stock as the Jaghuri. The Timuri, a tribe numbering about 1,000, with which this writer spent some time, are not mentioned by any of the earlier sources. The tribe seems to have been formed as a name group some time after the Great Rebellion, from lineages of Dai Kundi, Besud, and possibly other tribal origin.

Even before the Great Rebellion, as a consequence of which Afghans took over some of the territory of Uruzgani and Jaghuri sections, there had been a gradual encroachment of Afghans along the periphery of the
Hazarajat. Masson, who spent several years in Afghanistan in the 1830's, wrote that the district o Wardak had formerly been "possessed by the Hazaras, who about one hundred years since, were expelled by the Afghans. The Hazaras would also seem to have held the country from Karabagh to Ghazni, but have been in like manner partially expelled. Indeed, the encroachments of the Afghan tribes are still in progress". This encroachment continues today.

The Hazarajat is a country of high mountains and narrow valleys. It is estimated that the average elevation of the peaks is around 10,000 feet, and many rise to 12,000, 13,000 or even 15,000 feet. In the northeastern corner of Besud, narrow rapid streams drain eastward into the Ghorband, a tributary of the Kabul River. In the Dai Zangi territory, just north of the Kohi Baba ridge, rise some of the sources of the Heri Rud. Much of the Hazarajat, however, is oriented toward the Helmand River and its tributaries, which flow in a long, sweep southwestward toward the Sistan border of Iran. In the lower reaches of the rivers, the valleys are deep and marked with frequent gorges. The upper valleys are usually shallower and more open. Although occasional fertile plains are to be found, Broadfoot's description of one region is applicable to many parts of the Hazarajat: "I never saw anything wilder or more desolate. A steep footpath now descends the face of the hill, and ends in the valley of Jarmatu, a ravine between barren hills with a few yards of soil at the bottom".

In this high, interior area the winters are severe. The first slight snows begin in October, and heavy snow lies on the ground from December into March or April. During this time many communities in the upper valleys are snowbound. In April the snows begin to melt and for the next month or six weeks heavy rains swell the rivers. During the summer months no clouds dim the bright sky, and warm days are followed by cook, brisk nights. Except for an occasional wild almond in some of the upper valleys, no trees break the naked sweep of mountain and valley and only grasses and scattered shrubs soften the contours of the mountain slopes.

In such a habitat the Hazaras must painstakingly utilize every resource in order to survive. The narrow level floor of valley which can be irrigated are intensively cultivated. In some places, where the mountain slopes rise directly from the riverbanks, the lower slopes are terraced for crops. Irrigation channels, carefully banked with stone, are laboriously constructed, sometimes over a course of several miles, in order that unwatered level areas may be cultivated. Dry farming is practiced on such upper meadows as are available, but for the most part the vast stretches of mountainside are suitable only for grazing.

As a consequence, the Hazara economy is carefully balanced between agriculture and stockbreeding, with the latter playing a major role in the less fertile regions. The staple crops are barley, wheat, several kinds of
legumes, and, in some regions. Maize. Cucumbers and melons are often raised, and poplar or fruit trees are sometimes planted along the edges of the fields. Rotation of crops is practiced, and alfalfa or clover is planted when needed to enrich the soil. Great flocks of sheep are kept some of which are sold or bartered for additional grain or for commodities not available in the Hazarajat. Where the grass is rich, horses are raised for riding, and in the south, toward Ghazni and Kandahar, camels. A few cows and oxen are kept for milk and for drawing plows, ponies or mules serve as pack animals, and goats are also found, but the animal wealth of the Hazaras do not raise fodder for their animals. In the late summer, men and boys may be seen scattered about the mountainside for miles around every village, gathering wild grass and shrubs for use as winter fodder. Other plants and shrubs are collected for use as fuel. Hunting is unimportant in the economy.

Two tribes engage actively in trade - the Dai Mirdad and the Timuri, who send caravans deep into the Hazarajat to obtain good for sale in outside markets. The chief products obtained by Timuri merchants for sale in Kabul are roghan (clarified butter), baraq (a kind of woolen cloth for which the Hazaras are noted), and pileless woven rugs. The other tribes do not professional trading. The few imported goods they require, such as embroidery silks, cotton cloth, and spices, are obtained from itinerant Indian merchants.

In spite of the most careful utilization of resources, the Hazaras cannot always obtain a living from the land. Many Hazaras go every winter to seek employment at Kabul, Kandahar, and Quetta, returning home in the spring. This is particularly true of the Besud and Ghazni Hazaras and to a lesser extent of the Jaghuri. A number of Hazaras live in Kabul throughout theyear, returning to their homes only for visits.

The Hazaras live in fortified villages called qale set on the lower slope of the mountain just above their cultivated fields. Until the twentieth century many tribes spent the summer with their flocks in pastures a short distance from the villages, leaving only a few workers to look after the fields. Timuri informants could not remember a time when they had lived in tents during the summer, and it is probable that most of the Hazaras now live the year round in their villages.

As the new Emir, Abdur Rahman set out a goal to bring Hazarajat under his control. After facing resistance from the Hazaras, he launched several campaigns in Hazarajat with many atrocities and ethnic polarization. The southern part of Hazarajat was spared as they accepted Abdur Rahman's rule while the other parts of Hazarajat rejected Abdur Rahman and were supporting his uncle Sher Ali Khan and as a result had a war waged against them.

The first Hazara uprising was in 1888. Abur Rahman's cousin, Mohammad Eshaq, revolted against him and the Hazaras joined the revolt. The revolt was short lived and crushed as the Emir extended his control over large parts of Hazarajat. Heavy taxes were imposed and Pashtun administrators were sent to Hazarajat where they subjugated the people with many abuses. The people were disarmed, villages were looted, local tribal chiefs were imprisoned or executed, and the best lands were confiscated and given to Pashtun nomads (Kuchis).

Another uprising occurred in 1892. The cause of the uprising was the rape of the wife of a Hazara chief by 33 Afghan soldiers. The soldiers had entered their house under the pretext of searching for weapons and raped the chief's wife in front of him. The families of the Hazara chief and his wife retaliated against the humiliation and killed the soldiers and attacked the local garrison where they took back their weapons. Several other tribal chiefs who supported Abdur Rahman now turned against him and joined the rebellion which rapidly spread through the entire Hazarajat. In response to the rebellion, the Emir declared a "Jihad" against the Shiites and raised an army of 40,000 soldiers, 10,000 mounted troops, and 100,000 armed civilians (most of which where Pashtun nomads). He also brought in British military advisers to assist his army.
The large army defeated the rebellion at its center, in Oruzgan, by 1892 and the local population was severely massacred. According to S. A. Mousavi,

In response to the harsh repression, the Hazaras revolted again by early 1893. This revolt had taken the government forces by surprise and the Hazaras managed to take most of Hazarajat back. However even after months of fighting, they were eventually defeated due to a shortage of food. Small pockets of resistance continued to the end of the year as government troops committed atrocities against civilians and deported entire villages.
Abdur Rahman's subjugation of the Hazaras during this period gave birth to strong hatred between the Pashtuns and Hazaras for years to come. Massive forced displacements, especially in Oruzgan and Daychopan, continued as lands were confiscated and populations were expelled or fled. Some 15,000 families fled to northern Afghanistan, Mashhad (Iran), Quetta (Pakistan), and even as far as Central Asia. It is estimated that over half the Hazara population was massacred or displaced during Abdur Rahman's campaign against them. Hazara farmers were often forced to give up their property to Pashtuns and as a result many Hazara families had to leave seasonally to the major cities in Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan in order to find jobs and a source of income. Pakistan is now home to one of the largest settlements of Hazara particularly in and around the city of Quetta.

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 Hazaras intensified their struggle against the Soviet army and its puppet regime. A large number of Hazara clerics, who studied theology in Iran's religious centers in the 1960s and 1970s and had become acquainted with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomieni's radical Islamic ideology, joined the resistance. After consolidating their power base the Islamists began to oppose landowners with nationalist proclivities and the intellectuals, many of whom were members of various splinter groups of Shula-e-Jawid. Some clerics succeeded in excluding most landowners from the movement and executed members of the secular upper classes and Hazara clerics espousing the Sunni faith of Islam. This situation forced many landowners and secularly oriented intellectuals to flee to Pakistan. Execution of revolutionary Hazara élites by the government and the inability of the surviving revolutionaries to organize themselves and provide leadership to the Hazara movement enabled the Islamists to seize leadership of the movement. Hazaras in Kabul defied the Kabul regime and demonstrated their opposition by organizing an uprising in February 1980, known as the insurrection of She-e-Hoot (the third day of the 12th month of Hoot in the Arabic calendar). The uprising originated in several districts, including Qala-e-Shada, Dasht-e-Barchi, and Afshar. Demonstrators marched toward the Soviet embassy and attacked the house of former president Hafizullah Amin (killed by Soviet forces in December 1979) and several police stations, seizing arms and ammunition. The shura's influence on the resistance movement began to decline as new political organizations espousing radial ideologies effloresced in the Hazarajat. Ideological differences coupled with clashes of personality among their leadership effectively prevented the formation of a single party, which could articulate a consistent political line to guide the Hazaras armed struggle. In 1983 Sazman-e-Nasr and Sepah-e-Pasdaran came into existence and succeeded in driving Sayed Ali Behishi out of his capitulate Waras in Ghor province, thereby consolidating their positions within the Hazarajat by 1984. The Sepah was patterned after Iran's Revolutionary Guard and were more ideologically aligned to the Iranian leadership. These parties supported the establishment of an Islamic state and of a moral economy which rejected any demarcation on the basis of race, nation or state. Table 6 shows the Shiite organizations active in the resistance movement during and after the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Since the Soviet occupation there were approximately two million Afghan refugees in Iran working at various construction sites. The majority of the refugees are Shiite. Iran used its influence to encourage Shiite Hazaras to defend Iran in its war with Iraq, claiming that they will gain experience in the art of warfare which would enable them to effectively light the Soviets and the Kabul regime upon their return home. Prior to sending them to the war fronts the Iranian government pledged to provide them with six months military training inTaibad, Gilan, Qum, Sabzwar, Zahidan, Tehran, Zabul, Turbat-e-Jam, Sirjan and other military centers in Iran. During the first three months the trainees were paid a stipend of 6,000 Rials (Iranian currency) and 20,000 Rials during the remainder of the training period. The Iranian government pledged paying each of those trainees 30,000 Rials. The trainees complained that the Iranian leadership did not pay in full the stipends they were entitled to receive after returning from the Iran-Iraq. A facsimile of a letter by the organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Party of Afghanistan to the Guards of the Islamic Revolutionary of West Ham, Iran states that: We should like to inform you that the members of the organization who have fought against the troops of Saddam Hussain, the infidel, have received their salaries (1,5000 Rials per person monthly) although their previous salary per person was estimated at 25,000.

During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Hazarajat region did not see as much heavy fighting like other regions of Afghanistan. However, rival Hazara political factions had internal conflicts during this period. The division was across the Tanzáim-e nasl-e naw-e Hazara, a party based in Quetta of Hazara nationalists and secular intellectuals, and the pro-Khomeini Islamist parties backed by the new Islamic Republic of Iran. By 1979, the Iran backed Islamist groups liberated Hazarajat from the central Soviet-backed Afghan government and later these Islamist groups took entire control of Hazarajat away from the secularist groups. By 1984, after severe fighting, the secularist groups lost all their power to the Islamist groups. Later as the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the Islamist groups felt the need to broaden their political appeal and turned their focus to Hazara ethnic nationalism. This led to establishment of the Hezb-e Wahdat, an alliance of all the Hazara resistance groups (except the Harakat-e Islami). In 1992, with the fall of Kabul, the Harakat-e Islami took sides with Burhanuddin Rabbani's government while the Hezb-e Wahdat took sides with the opposition. The Hezb-e Wahdat was eventually forced out of Kabul by 1995 as the Pashtun Taliban movement treacherously captured and killed their leader Abdul Ali Mazari.

Alessandro Monsuttiargues, in his recent anthropological book, that migration is in fact the traditional way of life of the Hazara people, referring to the seasonal and historical migrations which have never ceased and do not seem to be dictated only by emergency situations such as war.
Besides the major populations of Hazaras in Quetta (Pakistan) where many have achieved considerably high positions within the government and police force and Iran, there are significant communities in Australia, New Zealand,Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and particularly the Northern European countries such as Sweden and Denmark. Many young Hazara are studying in developed countries such as Australia, legally through education or work visas. There are many Afghan Hazara who have migrated to developed countries especially in Australia as refugees. The famous case was the MV Tampa incident in which a shipload of refugees, mostly Hazaras, was rescued by the Norwegian freighter MV Tampa and subsequently sent to Nauru. Many refugee claims were rejected by Australia and forwarded to New Zealand, where all claims but one were approved.

The Hazara, outside of Hazarajat, have adopted the cultures of the cities where they dwell, and in many cases are quite Persianized. Traditionally the Hazara are highland farmers and although sedentary like the Tajiks, in the Hazarajat, they have retained many of their own customs and traditions, some of which are more closely related to those of Central Asia than to Iran. For instance, many Hazara musicians are widely hailed as being skilled in playing the dambura, a lute instrument similarly found in other Central Asian nations such as Uzbekistan and Mongolia. Interestingly, a skilled Hazara dambura musician, Dawood Sarkhosh sang a notably traditional Hazara folk song entitled, "Moghul Dokhtar," Persian for "Mongol Girl."

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, an international coalition intervened in Afghanistan and removed the Taliban from power and effectively saved the Hazaras from ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Taliban. Since then, the situation for Hazaras in Afghanistan has changed drastically and has much improved in a very short time. Today, due to the NATO involvement, Hazaras enjoy much more freedom and equality than ever before. Hazaras can now pursue higher education, enroll in the army, and have top government positions. For example, Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, a Hazara from the Hezb-e Wahdat party, was able to run in the 2004 presidential election in Afghanistan. However, discrimination still lingers.

Hazaras are one of the oppressed national minorities of the country. In the past they had been discriminated against on the basis of their faith, language and ethnicity. By partitioning the Hazarajat into several administrative units and replacing the world 'Hazarajat' by 'Manatiq-e-Markazi' (central region) the ruling class intended to eliminate Hazara's political, legal, national and historical identities through the articulation of a cultural policy aimed at assimilating Hazaras into the dominant culture. State coercive policies and practices forced Hazaras not to identify themselves as such. Although the ruling class succeeded in incorporating Hazarajat into the Afghan state, falsifying their history and culture either directly or indirectly, Hazara nationalism remained a strong force to be reckoned with. By co-opting a number of traditional Hazara chiefs the ruling class further divided the Hazaras by exploiting their religious differences (Jafaris versus Ismailis and Sunnis) to advance their own interest. One of the main objectives of the state in replacing the word 'Hazara' by 'Shia' is to transfer the political rights of the Hazaras to Shiites who lack a common background with the Hazaras. The process of Shiaization of the socio political and cultural sphere and the history of Hazaras claimants the rights of Hazaras to identify themselves as a nation. When a community's national identity is defined by its religion, national identity is certainly replaced by religious identify. Identifying Hazaras as Shiites poses a major threat to Hazaras social unity as there are Hazaras professing Sunni and Ismaili doctrines of Islam. Hazaras' struggle for liberation and their fight to assert their rights in the future could only be accomplished if the objective of their struggle is based on: (a) empowerment of the dispossessed Hazaras within their own community and gaining equal political status in Afghanistan's political arena in the post-Soviet era; (b) de-education of the Hazaras from their present cultural mores, which resulted in their bondage, in order to enable them to fight back social forces bent on enslaving them once again; (c) installation of the essence of an emancipatory perspective which defies the Shiaization of Hazaras' cultural, social, historical and political identity; and (d) provision of opportunities to enable the younger generation to acquire a modern education so that they may compete with non-Hazara élites in developing the future of Afghanistan's politics and development. Otherwise they will continue to lag behind and the power of the gun alone won't help them gain their rightful position in the country.