1. Current situation
Afghanistan is not lost but the signs are not good. Its growing insurgency reflects a collective failure to tackle the root causes of violence. Six years after the Taliban’s ouster, the international community lacks a common diagnosis of what is needed to stabilise the country as well as a common set of objectives. Long-term improvement of institutions is vital for both state building and counter-insurgency. Without a more strategic approach, the increased attention and resources now directed at quelling the conflict could even prove counterproductive by furthering a tendency to seek quick fixes. Growing tensions over burden sharing risk undermine the very foundations of multilateralism, including NATO’s future. The U.S., which is demanding more commitment by allies, must realise that its unilateral actions weaken the will of others. At the same time, those sniping from the sidelines need to recognise that the Afghan intervention is ultimately about global security and do more.
The caveats and short-term mandates imposed by many Western capitals on their troops hinder real planning and raise doubts about the depth of commitment. Countries that consider themselves major players in NATO such as Germany, France and Italy need to assume a greater share of the burden, including in areas of combat. While the Afghan people, the insurgents and neighbouring countries each in their own way need to know that resolve is strong, the international community is increasingly fragmented, allowing the insurgency to gain momentum and further emboldening spoilers. Despite growing calls for “coordination”, international efforts are marred by inability to agree on priorities and plans, even with regard to counter-insurgency. There are major disagreements over other vital areas such as counter-narcotics, with the U.S. continuing to press for aerial eradication of opium poppies despite resistance from nearly every other actor.
A stronger hand is essential to bring coherence to international efforts, both among the multiple players and in their approach to the Afghan administration. Great hopes have been placed on a strengthened mandate for the United Nations and a new Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) although there are more calls for coordination than players willing to be coordinated. The international community has never had executive authority in Afghanistan, but it controls most military and financial resources. This leverage should be better used to build Afghan capacity and accountability at central and, even more importantly, local levels which would be the ultimate guarantor of a stable, sustainable state.
The world witnessed on 11 September 2001 the consequences that a failed state can have for global security. If the international community does not stay the course in Afghanistan, the price could be inordinately high, including:
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a return to civil war, with factions divided along regional and ethnic lines;
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a narco-state with institutions controlled by multiple organised criminal gangs;
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a Pashtun-dominated south largely abandoned to lawlessness; and
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increased intervention by regional powers seeking to protect their interests.
Such an unstable Afghanistan, in which extremists have a strong foothold, would again pose a serious threat to global security. Western governments need to acknowledge the importance of defeating this threat at its source and then present the case far more convincingly than they have done to publics which appear increasingly unwilling to accept casualties or long-term commitment of adequate resources.
Streamlined military-to-military, civilian-to-military and civilian-to-civilian coordination is required. Priorities and interests must be reconciled, with a view to ensuring that:
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there is genuine commitment to coordination mechanisms;
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troop-contributing countries are prepared to deploy their forces, with the required mandates, wherever in the country they are needed;
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the focus of international efforts is on institution building rather than supporting individual Afghan players;
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the culture of impunity is tackled; and
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strategic interests in the region are reassessed, leading to efforts to address Pakistan realistically and to insulate Afghanistan as much as possible from any U.S.-Iran confrontation.
This is not a time for finger pointing or scaling down commitments. Neither Western publics nor the Afghan people have boundless patience; their support will disappear if the drift is not halted quickly. Other than rhetorically, the international community has aimed too low in Afghanistan, pandering to patronage networks rather than respecting the wishes of ordinary Afghan men and women for accountability and more inclusive peacebuilding. While addressing their own shortcomings, the internationals must also hold the Kabul government accountable for its failings. The situation is not hopeless, but it is bad, and an urgent collective effort is needed to tackle it.
The desire for a quick, cheap war followed by a quick, cheap peace is what has brought Afghanistan to the present, increasingly dangerous situation. It has to be recognised that the armed conflict will last many years but the population needs to be reassured now that there is a clear political goal of an inclusive state. Actions to fight the insurgency must be based on and enforce the rule of law with priority given to the reform of the police and judiciary. Short-term measures such as reliance on ill-trained and poorly disciplined militias, harsh, ad hoc anti-terrorism legislation and discredited power brokers from past eras will only undermine the long-term goal of building sustainable institutions. Political strategy talk seems to focus increasingly on making a deal with the Taliban. That is a bad idea. The key to restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan is not making concessions to the violent extremists but meeting the legitimate grievances of the population – who for the most part have eagerly supported democratisation. This position is outlined in Crisis Group's November 2006 report, Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes.
See Crisis Group’s latest reports:
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on the multi-faceted Taliban communications machine that is weakening public support for nation-building: Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words? (24 July 2008)
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on the need for increased coordination and commitment in international efforts: The Need for International Resolve (6 February 2008)
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on reforming and depoliticising the police: Reforming Afghanistan's Police (30 August 2007)
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on the need to view state-building and counter-insurgency efforts as complementary: Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, (29 January 2007).
2. What should be done
A summary of our most recent recommendations on reshaping international engagement in Afghanistan is found below. For earlier recommendations on police reform, and state-building efforts, see our respective earlier reports.
To the International Community, especially the U.S., other NATO Member States and States with Troop Commitments and Assistance Missions in Afghanistan:
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Emphasise that efforts will be maintained and adequately resourced as long as needed, including a full commitment of troops (with the necessary mandate and associated military resources) and satisfaction of the requirements for Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTS) to train the Afghan security forces.
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Allocate adequate resources for outreach programs to communicate the importance of the mission to domestic constituencies.
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Support development of a Contact Group of key international players (led by UN representatives and including the EU, NATO, U.S., UK, Germany and Canada) to meet regularly in and outside Afghanistan to steer strategic planning of the international engagement.
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Demonstrate real commitment to coordination mechanisms such as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB).
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Abolish the lead nation/key partner approach and give the UN more specific responsibility to coordinate international efforts in areas such as justice and sub-national governance, with emphasis on local capacity building.
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Reassess relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours, in particular the strong support given to Pakistan’s military-backed government, and seek to insulate Afghanistan from the consequences of U.S.-Iranian differences.
To the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB):
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Encourage the mutual accountability and greater effectiveness of donors and Afghan authorities by insisting on the proper functioning of the Consultative Board for Senior Government Appointments as agreed in the Afghanistan Compact and following through on Kabul’s commitments to transitional justice and disarmament; requiring regular donor reports on assistance programs to the finance ministry; and reducing the number of Consultative Groups (CGs), requiring them to meet more regularly, and equipping each group with a secretariat to follow up on actions between meetings.
To the United Nations Secretary-General:
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Ensure that UNAMA has sufficient resources to fulfil its mandate by reassessing staffing levels and reviewing and encouraging member states as necessary to meet fiscal and material needs in the conflict-hit areas, particularly in transportation and communications.
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Stimulate greater coordination with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), including by basing UN liaison officers at ISAF headquarters and increasing contact at regional levels.
To the United Nations Security Council:
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Emphasise at the next renewal of UNAMA’s mandate a regional approach to UN programming inside Afghanistan, including building up regional offices and close cooperation with ISAF.
To NATO/ISAF:
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Harmonise the mandates of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) by emphasising their security sector roles and phasing out development activities in areas where civilian-led approaches by the UN and others are more appropriate.
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Seek the transition of Afghan National Army (ANA) training and mentoring to ISAF command contingent upon the alliance and its members providing the necessary resources.
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Emphasise at the renewal of ISAF’s mandate the importance of integrating UNAMA political input at every level of operational planning.
3. Background to the conflict
The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda was the latest manifestation of a conflict that had been running for nearly three decades. Afghanistan was first invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979, which withdrew in 1989 after a decade of fighting with anti-communist mujahidin. With continuing factionalism among the mujahidin, the Taliban eventually seized power, controlling about 90 per cent of Afghanistan's territory and permitting al-Qaeda to operate freely from there, until U.S. and allied military action following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.
In December 2001, leaders from the Afghan opposition and diaspora met in Bonn, Germany, and drew up plans for a political transition starting with a provisional government structure, which led to the naming of Hamid Karzai as chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) on 22 December 2001. The AIA held a nationwide Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) in June 2002, and Karzai was elected president of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan (see Crisis Group’s May 2002 report, The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward?). In December 2003, the Transitional Authority held a second nationwide Loya Jirga in Kabul to debate a draft Constitution, which was ultimately adopted in January 2004 (see Crisis Group’s December 2003 report, Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga). After threats of boycott, violence and claims of fraud the first ever direct presidential election on 9 October was largely succesful (see Crisis Group's November 2004 report, Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections). Parliamentary and provincial elections were held in September 2005; exclusion of political parties from electoral process may compromise the strength of the legislature(see Crisis Group's May 2006 report, Afghanistan's New Legislature: Making Democracy Work).
